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Would Scotland be economically better off as an independent country?
Since the discovery of large deposits of oil and gas off the Scottish coast this
question has been an important part of the political debate. We republish
here C. R. Smallwood's controversial article in which he stated the,
economic case against independence. When Smallwood's article appeared:
in the Scotsman it led to a prolonged and diverse correspondence. One of
Smallwood's most convincing antagonist was Professor D. I. MacKay.
Professor MacKay has restated his argument for us and we have given
each the chance to reply to the other. So the main articles are followed by
two postscripts. We are grateful to the editor of the Scotsman for his
permission to reprint the original article. 
The Economics 
of Independence 
C.R.Smallwood D. I. MacKay 
One of the most striking aspects of the political debate in Scotland at
present is the commonly held belief that- whether or not independence is
desirable on other grounds - Scotland would be much better off
economically if she opted for independence. 
The Nationalists, of course, have a vested interest in arguing that if only
there were a Scottish Government, with acce.ss to the untold riches of the
North Sea, Scotland's economic difficulties would soon be over. What is
more surprising however is that the major political parties in Scotland
have not yet presented any systematic rebuttal of the Nationalists'
economic case. 
From the point of view of the Government's devolution proposals, it is
unfortunate that such a rebuttal has not been made. For as long as the view
prevails that independence would bestow enormous economic benefits on
Scotland, it is inevitable that whatever the devolution White Paper
contains, it will be regarded as an inadequate response to Scotland's needs
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and aspirations. If those proposals are to receive a fair hearing, therefore, 
it is essential to take a clear and dispassionate look at what, in economic 
terms, independence would really entail. 
The fact is that a serious analysis of the economic prospects of an 
independent Scotland does not indicate that in economic terms 
independence is clearly Scotland's best option. The economic gains which 
independence might bring would be much less than commonly imagined, 
and the economic costs and difficulties and risks, hardly ever mentioned, 
would be considerable. Consequently, there is no necessity for those people 
who are Scottish and who wish to remain citizens of the UK to concede the 
economic argument to the other side. The purpose of this article is to 
explain why any analysis of the economic consequences of independence 
has to come to terms with a number of basic questions. Granted that 
Scottish independence would have to be negotiated, what would the terms 
of an independence settlement be? Would Scotland remain a partofthe UK 
monetary union, or would there be a separate Scottish currency with its 
own rate of exchange? How much would the oil revenues really be worth? 
While we cannot give definite answers to these questions, it seems 
reasonable to make the following suppositions- which arc, if anything, 
rather favourable to the separatist case. 
Oil: No one knows what will happen to oil prices in the coming years. 
There are persuasive arguments both ways. It is reasonable therefore to 
think in terms of a constant price, and consequently to have in mind a figure 
of £3,000 million for North Sea oil revenues. 
Division of oil revenues: While international legal conventions would 
seem to give Scotland most of the oil, independence would have to be 
negotiated, and essential UK interests would be involved. Moreover, the 
UK Government now has' 'joint participation" with the oil companies in the 
development of the oilfields, and any independence settlement would have 
to involve a guarantee by Scotland to provide a "fair return" to the rest of 
the UK in recognition of its capital stake. For these reasons, the Scottish 
Government would do well to receive two-thirds of the oil revenues, and this 
is what is assumed here. 
Monetary union: While there would be pressures to maintain the 
monetary union, so that it might survive Scottish independence, it is more 
likely that the constraints that this would involve on the freedom of action of 
a newly independent government would be unacceptable to it. It is more 
reasonable to suppose that Scotland would leave the monetary union, 
establish its own monetary system and allow the Scots£ to vary in relation 
to the UK£. 
On this basis, it is possible to trace out the major effects of independence 
on Scotland's economy. 
Balance of payments: If the Scottish Government left the rate of 
depletion unchanged, it would receive £2,000 million a year in oil revenues 
and the balance of payments would benefit accordingly. The Government 
would, however, be under pressure to cut the depletion rate both to 
conserve the oil, and for environmental reasons. On the other hand, it would 
be under pressure to deliver many of the benefits which had been promised, 
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and it would have the oil companies to contend with. It is unlikely theretor
that the depletion rate would be halved, as has been suggested in some
quarters. A much more modest cut might be made, say 10 to 15 per cent-
which would reduce revenues by £400 million per year, leaving an annual
flow of £1,600 million. 
This figure, however, would not represent the balance of payments
surplus; this would be reduced by Scotland's existing "non-oil" deficit.
According to the best estimates we have, this has been running at about 10 
per cent of Scotland's GDP for some time, which makes it now about £600 
million. So Scotland's initial balance of payments surplus following 
independence might be of the order of £1,000 million, or about 15 per cent of 
Scotland's GDP. 
Rate of inflation: It is unlikely that the payments surplus could be 
maintained for long, and very likely that Scotland's rate of inflation would 
begin to rise. On the demand side, while it is not inevitable that the new oil 
money would cause excess demand to appear, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that, following independence which had come about because the 
Scottish people wanted to cash in on an oil bonanza, there would be 
enormous pressures both for increases in public expenditure and for tax 
reductions. 
The Government might in any case favour the creation of excess demand 
to raise the rates of employment and growth, and in this case, the 
inflationary pressures would not be resisted. On the cost side, a huge spate 
of wage demands could be expected, as different groups in society 
determined to seize "their share" of the new wealth they had been told 
independence would bring. 
As the price level in Scotland rose, for both demand and cost reasons, and 
as rising consumer demand caused the rate of importing to increase 
steadily, the balance of payments surplus would steadily disappear; in 
effect, the income from oil, at first accruing only to the Government, would 
be translated into a higher standard of living throughout the country, by the 
mechanism of social conflict. The gain in income per head, on the basis of 
the analysis so far, would be about 15 per cent. 
Exchange rate: With an initial large balance of payments surplus, the 
Scottish Government would be unable to prevent the exchange rate rising. 
It would see advantage in this in helping to control the rate of inflation, but 
the damage a rising rate or "strong pound" would do to the competitive-
ness of Scottish industry would also be evident. The Government would 
therefore wish to restrict the rise in the rate, and would do this by arranging 
for or permitting the export of capital- i.e. investing oil revenues overseas 
-and this would further reduce the overall balance of payments surplus. 
In so far as oil revenues were invested abroad, they would, of course, not 
be available to raise incomes in Scotland: the figure to have in mind as an 
indicator of the likely gain in incomes per head as a result of independence 
is therefore much less than 15 per cent. 
Employment: It is fair to anticipate a rising level of internal demand 
following independence, both because of the inflationary pressure and 
because of deliberate Government policy. This would be helpful for 
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business and employment. But most of Scottish industry does not serve the 
scottish market. Most Scottish goods are sold in the English market and 
overseas. Following Scottish independence, the rest of the UK would be 
depressed and demand for Scottish goods there would be low. Moreover, 
the position of Scottish industry in English markets would never wholly 
recover as the UK £ floated down and the Scots £ floated up. 
As for overseas markets, as the Scots pound floated up (augmented by 
the rising inflation rate), Scottish industry would continue to lose 
competitiveness, and its existing rate of decline would be speeded up. Thus 
following independence there would soon develop a chronic problem of 
structural unemployment, not amenable to Keynesian measures because 
of the openness of the Scottish economy. The rate of job losses might easily 
rise to 35,000 a year, at which rate it would only take three years for 
unemployment in Scotland to rise to 10 per cent. 
Investment and growth: Some of the supporters of separatism argue that 
a Scottish Government with access to oil revenues would be able to 
"regenerate" the Scottish economy, so that there would be dynamic gains 
to add to the once-over gain in income per head which has ·already been 
mentioned. It is important to consider ofwhatordersuch "dynamic gains" 
might be. 
The Scottish Government might seek to raise the rate of investment by 
increasing the level of internal demand and raising the rates of assistance 
to industry at present given under the regional policy. The limited effect of 
raising the level of demand in the Scottish economy has already been 
explained. As for attracting new industry by raising rates of assistance, the 
rising exchange rate would make Scotland an unattractive location for 
mobile industry serving markets in England or the EEC, and assistance 
would have to be increased substantially simply to maintain the present 
position. 
If, nevertheless, it is conceded that these measures might have some 
effect in raising the rate of investment, it remains true that according to the 
best evidence we have, the rate of investment has to be raised a great deal 
(say 50 per cent) in order to raise the growth rate a little (say 1 per cent) .It 
is rational to suppose therefore that any increase in Scotland's growth rate 
following independence would be very small. 
So the overall conclusion which emerges from an analysis of the 
economic benefits and costs of independence is two-fold. On the one hand, 
there might be an increase in income per head of "less than 15 per cent", 
depending on the extent to which oil revenues were invested abroad. It 
might be best to take more explicit account of this factor and think in terms 
of a gain between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. 
On the other hand, considerable costs would be incurred, including 
damage to Scotland's industrial structure as the rate of decline of Scottish 
industry speeded up; large-scale structural unemployment; serious 
inflationary pressure damaging not only Scotland's economy but also the 
cohesion of its society. 
Whatever balance the partisans on different sides of the argument might 
choose to strike between these· gains and costs, it is certainly not obvious 
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that the Scottish people should regard independence as desirable from th  
economic point of view, however they regard it on other grounds. 
And there is another factor in the background - the risk of economic·
disaster to an economy dependent for its viability on oil revenues, should
the price of oil drift down. 
If the independence game really is not worth the economic candle, it
should be recognised that it is not, if only so that people can make a fair
assessment of the relative benefits contained in the devolution proposals,
If independence, because of the costs and risks involved, is not on 
balance preferable to the present situation, and if ·devolution offers 
Sc<?tla~d economic benefits, then. it wil~ be devolution and not separatism 
which IS Scotland's best economic optiOn. 
A Rejoinder D.I.Mackay 
Major constitutional questions such as devolution, federalism or
independence cannot be resolved on narrow economic arguments. Hence,
it is not my purpose here to advocate any type of constitutional settlement
for Scotland for the following analysis is concerned solely with the
comparative economic advantages conferred on Scotland by (a) 
devolution as currently proposed, and (b) independence. 
Christopher Smallwood has suggested that the economic benefits
conferred on Scotland by the former are greater than, or at least
comparable to, the economic benefits arising from independence. In
particular he suggests that the economic benefits arising from North Sea
oil and gas production are much less than is commonly supposed. I find his
argument quite unconvincing as it rests on the fundamental premise that
the Scots would choose an economic policy of almost criminal recklessness.
Governments do sometimes act in this way as British citizens know to their
cost. However, it is of little interest to argue that misconceived policies will
dissipate any advantage. We can all accept that proposition. Of more
interest, or at least of more interest to the dispassionate observer, is
whether devolution or independence provides a better framework within
which to apply sensible economic policy to deal with Scotland's economic
problems. 
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It might be useful to begin by stating the area of agreement between 
Christopher Smallwood and myself. I would accept the following points he 
raises: 
(1) He estimates that on present policies there might be an annual 
revenue from oil production of some £3,000 million annually by the 1980s. 
(2) In the event of Scottish independence some part of oil revenues is 
likely to accrue to England and Wales. However, it appears probable that 
the bulk of the revenues would accrue to Scotland and Smallwood assumes 
that Scotland's share might amount to two-thirds of the total. 
(3) Revenue on this scale would result in a massive surplus on the 
current account of Scotland's balance of payments. 
(4) Given the situation described in (1) and (3) the exchange rate would 
tend to float upwards, making it more difficult for the traditional exporting 
industries to compete in world markets unless their efficiency could be 
improved. This process cannot be accomplished easily and an attempt to 
force the pace would both increase theTate of inflation and the level of 
unemployment. 
All this seems to be quite incontestable. However, the final outcome 
Smallwood predicts will only arise given the inappropriate policies which 
he suggests. They do not represent the inevitable outcome of independence. 
More sensible policies offer the prospect of real economic advantage and 
we should pursue this rather than the hares let out of the bag by Christopher 
Smallwood. 
First , it is clear that the reserves of North Sea oil and gas are so large 
that they would remove, for an extremely long period, any constraint on 
Scottish economic growth arising from an unfavourable balance of 
payments current account. There is no need at all to allow this to be 
reflected immediately in a rise in the exchange rate. Smallwood arrives at 
this conclusion by making an implicit assumption that a Scottish 
government would follow the same rate of depletion as a British 
government. This is an extraordinary position to adopt as it implies that a 
policy suitable for an economy with a population of 55 million is also 
suitable for an economy one-tenth of that size. Of course, it is not and it 
should hardly surprise us to find that Smallwood can "prove" such a policy 
unsuitable. Once this assumption falls the whole of Smallwood's argument 
collapses, and the assumption must fall for the rate of depletion of oil and 
gas reserves is not established by divine authority. If a quick rate of 
depletion yields too large a surplus on current account then the rate of 
depletion can always be reduced. There is little room to doubt that an 
independent Scottish government would choose a much lower rate of 
depletion than that likely to be chosen by a British government. All that we 
are saying is that as the balance of payments problems of Scotland and 
Britain would be different, the depletion policies which would be 
appropriate are also different (compare Norwegian and U.K. depletion 
policies). 
Again, Smallwood pays little attention to the capital account of the 
balance of payments. A surplus on the current account can be offset by 

















invested abroad, they would of course not be available to raise incomes in  
Scotland". This is an extremely shortsighted view. Investment overseas 
produces a stream of future income which does raise national income. 
Those familiar with British economic history will understand the process 
and also the economic benefits it can confer. The use of oil revenues to 
finance capital investment abroad yielding a future income is one obvious 
means of spreading the benefits over a longer period. This could secure a 
favourable balance of payments position for a long period after the oil and 
gas reserves are exhausted. 
In brief, North Sea oil and gas reserves offer the real possibility of 
"buying time" during which the fundamental restructuring of the Scottish 
economy can be attempted. The period of time bought can be extended by 
appropriate economic policies. Of course, it will be extremely difficult to 
deal with the underlying economic problem for Scotland, like Britain, is an 
extremely inefficient economy by the standards of Western Europe. Heavy 
and selective emigration has left Scotland very short of business and 
entrepreneurial skills, a shortage aggravated by the prevailing emphasis 
on other skills and professions. Decades of low investment, low labour 
productivity, restricted labour mobility and abysmal industrial relations 
are not changed by the acquisition of political independence. However, 
these difficulties must be faced in any constitutional environment; they are 
as much a present fact for devolution as for independence. 
The crucial fact to grasp about North Sea oil and gas is that the major 
benefits accrue to central government which has the right to tax North Sea 
oil and gas production. Smallwood concedes that these benefits would arise 
to a Scotland with political independence. Certainly they will not accrue 
within the devolutionary framework currently proposed as this specifically 
excludes any revenue sharing scheme. Economic growth in an independent 
Scotland need not be restricted by balance of payments constraints. If one 
favours a "market approach", as I do, it would be perfectly possible to 
encourage investment by reducing corporation tax and to reduce the penal 
rate of taxation, whichjn present-day Britain inhibits risk-taking and the 
acquisition of skills. Smallwood appears to think that such measures would 
make little appreciable difference. For example, he suggests a 50 per cent 
increase in the rate of investment would raise the growth rate by 1 per cent, 
which he regards as very small. This appears to be a matter of arithmetic. 
A 1 per cent increase in the rate of economic growth represents, over any 
substantial period, a major difference in outcome. If Britain's growth rate 
over the last three decades had been 1 per cent higher, then it would 
compare favourably with other advanced industrial countries and we 
would all be a lot richer. Any reader who is not convinced should consult the 
compound interest formula and calculate the difference between, say 2 per 
cent and 3 per cent growth. 
In short, independence and North Sea oil do not offer any easy solution to 
the real economic difficulties involved in restructuring the Scottish 
economy. It only offers a framework within which there is a good chance 
that sensible policies might find solutions. There are other constitutional 
possibilities, but here it must be said that Smallwood is strangely silent on 
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the economic advantages which will accrue from the present devolutionary 
proposals. Perhaps this is not surprising as the proposals do not change 
fundamental economic relationships and will grant to a Scottish Assembly 
less power to raise its own revenue than that normally accorded to a local 
authority. 
POSTSCRIPT TO THE DEBATE 
C. R. Smallwood 
Having read Professor MacKay's riposte to my article, I think it can 
fairly be said that he and I are in broad agreement about the likely 
economic consequences of independence for Scotland, and that the 
remaining differences between us are matters of political judgment rather 
than economic analysis. Perhaps I could illustrate this by making three 
points. 
(l) In my article, I explained that a flood of new oil money into the 
Scottish economy would cause considerable disruption, and I suggested 
that anyone wishing to decide whether or not independence was desirable 
in economic terms would need to weigh the costs of such disruption against 
the gains in income per head which the oil money would also provide. I quite 
agree with Professor MacKay that my analysis rested on the assumption 
that a Scottish government would follow the same rate of depletion as a 
British government. The reason I assumed this is that it is indeed the policy 
of the Scottish National Party to maintain a depletion rate in excess of 
lOOm. tons a year, and the purpose of the article was to trace out the 
economic effects of that policy. If, however, the policy were to be changed, 
and the new Scottish government were to cut down the depletion rate 
significantly, or were to invest oil revenues abroad on a large scale, then 
Professor MacKay and I agree that most of the disruption about which I 
wrote could be avoided. The corollary of this, however, is that the increase 
in Scottish national income would be correspondingly less, and would not be 
such as to justify the economic expectations which the political campaign 
in Scotland has generated. Too much emphasis should not be put on any 
particular set of figures, but if for the sake of argument Scotland did 
receive two-thirds of the oil revenues as I assumed in my article, and if the 
Scottish government say halved the depletion rate of the reserves it 
controlled, then after the existing Scottish trade deficit had been financed, 
the resulting increase in Scotland's national income might be of the order of 
£400 million to £500 million (1974 prices). This is the equivalent of 7 to 8 per 
cent of Scotland's GNP, and therefore fails to qualify as the expected 
bonanza. 
(2) I agree with Professor MacKay that this would nevertheless be a 
gain worth having, and would buy a certain amount of time for 
restructuring the Scottish economy. But I am more sceptical than he is that 
the new money would in fact be used for this purpose. It seems to me that in 
the circumstances of newly won independence, political pressures and 
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expectations would be such as to cause what new funds there were to be 
diverted to meet many demands other than that for new industrial 
investment, so that the new opportunity to restructure Scottish industry 
would be much more limited than he supposes. But this is a political rather 
than an economic judgment, and therefore one on which we are entitled to 
differ. 
(3) Where I disagree with Donald MacKay is in his assumption that 
devolution will not bring any economic advantages to Scotland. Again, the 
difference between us is one of political rather than economic judgment. 
My view is that, following devolution, more and more UK resources will be 
diverted to Scotland. The devolved services and now the Scottish 
Development Agency are to be financed from a block grant which the 
Scottish Assembly is to negotiate each year with the UK government. In 
these negotiations- and especially while the separatist party is enjoying 
electoral success - the Scottish Assembly will be in a bargaining position 
of considerable strength, so that it is not fanciful to suppose that the level of 
expenditure in Scotland, both on the social services and on industrial 
development, could be pushed up over a number of years by some hundreds 
of millions of pounds. This, after all, is the great fear of English MPs, and 
the principal reason why their support for the Devolution Bill may be 
difficult to secure. 
My overall judgment, therefore, which I stress is a political one as much 
as it is economic, is that the financial and economic gains to Scotland 
(i) of independence -assuming now that a ''responsible" economic policy 
is adopted by the Scottish government, involving either a substantial 
reduction in the rate of depletion of the oil reserves, or heavy investment of 
the oil revenues abroad, to avoid the difficulties highlighted in my 
article; and 
(ii) of devolution- assuming the block grant system works to Scotland's 
advantage in the way it seems likely to; 
may well be broadly comparable. 
ANOTHER POSTSCRIPT 
D. I. MacKay 
Christopher Smallwood and I may be close to agreement on a number of 
points, but the differences remain important. We agree that massive oil 
revenues could be used to sharply raise consumption in an independent 
Scotland but that, given the limited absorptive capacity of the Scottish 
economy, this would adversely affect the long-term competitive position of 
the economy. Again, we agree that raising the level of efficiency of the 
economy cannot be easily accomplished. Further, we could agree that 
neither the current devolutionary proposals, nor independence would 
suddenly and permanently produce a transformation of Scottish living 
standards. However, I do not believe that the current devolutionary 
proposals offer any real prospect of such a transformation, even in the long 
106 
run. On the other hand, oil revenues, by providing an extremely strong 
balance of payments position, could allow an independent Scotland to 
pursue policies which would have a good chance of producing significant 
long-run economic advantages. Of course there are other constitutional 
possibilities, but I believe any settlement which does not provide Scotland 
with some share of oil revenues, and the power to use them effectively, will 
not create the necessary conditions for a major improvement in economic 
performance. If a Scottish Assembly or Parliament does not obtain access 
to oil revenues then the major benefits of North Sea oil will pass Scotland 
by. This proposition appears to be quite irrefutable and it is difficult to 
believe that such a situation will prove to be politically stable. 
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